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NOTES
RULE 10b-5 DEVELOPMENTS-THEORIES OF
LIABILITY
Section 10(b)' of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) and
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-51 form a cornerstone of
federal securities regulation.3 The prohibitions of rule 10b-5 are broad
enough to cover almost all malpractices connected with securities trans-
actions.4 Although the '34 Act does not expressly authorize a civil
remedy under rule 10b-5, courts have implied a private right of action
under the rule.' To prevail in a private cause of action under rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant, acting with scienter,8 made a
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange ... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
pre-eribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
' See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 490 (1977).
The legislative history of section 10(b) indicates that Congress designed section 10(b) as a
catchall device to prevent unforeseen manipulative or deceptive practices in the securities
markets. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934); Report
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1934).
' See Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
' See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F.
Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (recognizing private right of action).
' See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Scienter is an "intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. See also Rolf v. BIyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d,
38, 44 (2d Cir.) (recklessness can constitute scienter), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
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misrepresentation or omission of material fact 7 or engaged in other
manipulative or deceptive conduct8 in connection with a purchase or sale
of any security.' In cases of misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show
reliance on the misrepresentation," but in cases of omission, a showing
of materiality raises a presumption of reliance." A plaintiff also must
prove that defendant's conduct was the cause in fact of an actual
economic loss. 12 Additionally, a plaintiff must have been a purchaser or
seller of a security to have standing to sue."3 Courts traditionally have in-
terpreted section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 broadly to further the remedial
purposes of the '34 Act.4 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court
has manifested a desire to restrict the scope of the private cause of ac-
tion under rule 10b-5. 1
' See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 f.S. 128, 152-54 (1972)
(misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material fact can violate rule 10b-5). In TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable stockholder would consider the fact impor-
tant in deciding how to act. Id. at 449. Although TSC defined materiality in the context of
SEC rule 14a-9, courts have employed the TSC test for materiality in the context of rule
10b-5. See, e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Research
Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 35 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1978).
' See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981) (not only misrepresentations
and omissions but also courses of conduct and broad schemes to defraud violate rule 10b-5);
Competition Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814
(2d Cir. 1975) (conduct collateral to misrepresentations and omissions can violate rule 10b-5);
1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 1.4 (1968).
' See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir. 1977).
'o See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d
Cir. 1974).
" See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Forrestal
Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
" See Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975); see also 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(a) ('34 Act § 28) (limiting recovery to actual damages).
" See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
" See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (courts
should interpret rule 10b-5 broadly and flexibly); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1972) (rule 10b-5 should be interpreted broadly and flexibly);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (interpret rule 10b-5 broadly to further
remedial purposes of '34 Act). Courts have identified many purposes of the '34 Act. See,
e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (to implement philosophy of full
disclosure); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1050 (7th Cir.) (to prevent
unfair practices in marketplace), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 875 (1977); United States v. Charnay,
537 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.) (to maintain free and honest markets), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1000
(1976); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 91 (5th Cir. 1975) (to protect investors);
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1975) (to achieve high standard of business
ethics in securities industries); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974 (to promote equal access to information); Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (to protect investors' confidence in securities markets);
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.) (to equalize bargaining posi-
tion of parties to securities transaction), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) and cert. denied,
405 U.S. 918 (1972. See generally 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5, pt. 1, §§ 6.01-6.09
(1980) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS].
15 See, e.g., Chia~rella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980) (only relationship of
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I. MISAPPROPRIATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
In Chiarella v. United States"8 the Supreme Court held that under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 mere possession of material nonpublic infor-
.mation does not create a duty to disclose the information to the other
party to a securities transaction.17 Instead, the Court held that a duty to
disclose arises from a relationship of trust and confidence between the
parties to a securities transaction. Dissenting in Chiarella, Chief
Justice Burger argued that regardless of the absence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the parties to a securities transaction, the act of misap-
trust and confidence and not mere possession of inside information creates duty to disclose);
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (private action under rule 10b-5 will
not lie for mere breach of fiduciary duty without deception or manipulation); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (allegation of negligence insufficient to state cause of
action for damages under rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
749 (1975) (only purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to sue in private action for
damages under rule 10b-5). Since Blue Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court has not emphasized
the need to interpret section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 broadly and flexibly. Instead, the Court ex-
amines the statutory language and legislative history of the '34 Act to determine the scope
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477
(1977); Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 (1976). If the-language or legislative
history of the '34 Act is not determinative, the Court resolves a question of interpretation
on the basis of policy considerations such as the need to reduce vexatious litigation or to
protect the autonomy of state corporate law. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 478-80 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975).
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
12 445 U.S. at 235. In Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court reversed Vincent
Chiarella's criminal conviction for violating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. at 237. Chiarella,
a markup man for a financial printer, deduced the names of acquiring and target corpora-
tions from unprinted, undistributed announcements of impending takeover bids. Id. at 224.
After uncovering the corporations' identities, Chiarella used the information to purchase
stock in target corporations. Id. Chiarella sold the stock for a profit after the an-
nouncements of the takeovers caused the price of the stock to rise. Id. In determining
whether Chiarella owed a duty to disclose to the sellers of target corporation stock, the
Court found the language and legislative history of the '34 Act inconclusive. Id. at 226. Ac-
cordingly, the Court looked to prior federal court decisions and SEC enforcement actions.
Id. at 226-30. The Court concluded that prior decisions had emphasized that the existence of
a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to a securities transaction gives
rise to a duty to disclose. Id. For example, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961),
the SEC emphasized that a duty to disclose arises from the existence of a relationship afford-
ing access to inside information intended only for a corporate purpose and the unfairness of
allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of inside information by trading without
disclosure. Id. at 912 & n. 15. The Chiarella Court viewed Cady, Roberts as establishing
that the relationship of trust and confidence between corporate insiders of an issuer and the
stockholders of the issuer imposes upon an insider a duty to disclose before purchasing or
selling the issuer's stock. 445 U.S. at 227. Moreover, the Court stated that at common law a
duty to disclose to the other party in a transaction arose only from a relationship of trust
and confidence between the parties. Id. at 230. Since Chiarella had no relationship giving
him access to inside information of the takeover targets, he was not an insider of the
takeover targets and had no relationship of trust and confidence with the stockholders of
target corporations who sold stock to him. Id. at 231. In the absence of a relationship of
trust and confidence, the Court held that Chiarella was under no duty to disclose. Id.
IS Id. at 230; see note 2 supra.
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propriating confidential information should create an absolute duty to
disclose the information to the other party to the securities transaction.19
The majority, however, refused to consider the validity of a misap-
propriation theory of liability since the district court had not presented
the theory to the jury." In United States v. Newman,2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the act of misap-
propriating confidential information in itself is a deceptive practice
violating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5."
In Newman, E. Jacques Courtois and Adrian Antoniu were
employees of investment banking firms representing companies involved
in corporate mergers and takeovers.' Over a period of six years Cour-
19 445 U.S. at 240. Dissenting in Chiarella, Chief Justice Burger viewed the absence of
a duty to disclose in an arm's-length business transaction as a reward for a businessman's
skill, diligence, and astuteness in securing and evaluating data concerning a transaction. See
id. Yet, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the policies that establish the rule allowing par-
ties to an arm's-length transaction not to disclose should limit the rule's scope. Id. In par-
ticular, the Chief Justice argued that the rule permitting nondisclosure should not apply
when one party obtains an informational advantage by unlawful means. Id. (quoting Keeton,
Fraud- Concealment and Nondisclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1936)). Further, the Chief
Justice argued that the language and legislative history of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are
consonant with a rule that one who misappropriates nonpublic information has an absolute
duty to disclose that information or abstain from trading. Id. Since the provisions of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 reach any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme, the broad language
of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 contradict the suggestion that congressional concern was
restricted to corporate insiders or deceptive practices relating to information derived from
the corporation. Id. at 240 & n. 1.
Chief Justice Burger also found support for a duty to disclose based upon a misap-
propriation of confidential information in the legislative history of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5. Id. at 241. Congress designed the antifraud provisions to assure that dealing in
securities is "fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors." Id.
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975)). The antifraud provisions prohibit those
"manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2 Sess. 6 (1934)). Chief Justice Burger
asserted that an investor who purchases or sells securities based on misappropriated non-
public information has an undue advantage, and the misappropriation has no useful function.
Id. Additionally, the Chief Justice found the misappropriation theory consistent with In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961). Chief Justice Burger emphasized that under the
Cady, Roberts test an insider must disclose because of access to data intended only for cor-
porate purposes because of the inherent unfairness of trading on information unavailable to
others. 445 U.S. at 241. Chief Justice Burger stated that both these factors exist whenever a
person obtains an informational advantage by unlawful methods. Id. at 41-42. He also em-
phasized that imposing a duty to disclose on a person who acquires material nonpublic infor-
mation by misappropriation would not endanger legitimate business practices such as
warehousing. Id. at 242; see note 33 infra (definition of warehousing).
' 445 U.S. at 236. A court cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory
not presented to the jury. Lewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 814 (1971); see Dunn v.
United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979).
21 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 17; see text accompanying notes 50-56 infra.
664 F.2d at 15. From 1972 to 1975 both Courtois and Antoniu were employed at
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (Morgan Stanley) Id. In 1975, Antoniu left Morgan Stanley and
became employed by Kuhn & Loeb Co., now known as Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. Id.
[Vol. 39:969
10b-5 DEVELOPMENTS
tois and Antoniu conveyed confidential information of their employers
concerning the identify of merger and takeover targets of corporate
clients to James Mitchell Newman, a securities trader and manager of a
New York brokerage firm.24 Newman in turn passed on the information
to Franklin Carniol and Constantine Spyropoulos.25 Concealing their ac-
tivities by using secret foreign bank and trust accounts and spreading
purchases among brokers, Newman, Carniol, and Spyropoulos used the
confidential information to purchase stock in companies that were
merger or takeover targets of the investment banking firms' corporate
clients. 26 When the price of the target companies' stocks rose after an-
nouncement of the mergers and takeovers, Newman, Carniol, and
Spyropoulos sold the stocks for a substantial gain, sharing the profits
with Courtois and Antoniu.'
Newman was indicted for aiding and abetting' a violation of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 and for conspiring - to violate section 10(b) and rule





- 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides that "[w]hoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures ... commission [of the of-
fense] is punishable as a principal:' Id. Section 32(a) of the '35 Act sanctions criminal
penalties against any person who willfully violates the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976). Courts
also have held that a defendant in a civil action can be liable for aiding and abetting a viola-
tion by another defendant. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d
793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides that "[i]f two or more persons conspire ... to commit
any offense against the United States ... [and] do any act to effect the object of the con-
spiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both." Id. Courts also have held that in civil actions, a defendant can be held liable for con-
spiring with a primary violator. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 265 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d
242, 249 (6th Cir. 1962).
1 664 F.2d at 14, 16. The indictment in Newman charged that Courtois and Antoniu
"breached the trust and confidence placed in them and their employers by the employers'
corporate clients and the clients' shareholders and the trust and confidence placed in Cour-
tois and Antoniu by their employers." 664 F.2d at 15-16. The indictment further charged
that Newman, Carniol and Spyropoulos "aided, participated in and facilitated Courtois and
Antoniu in violating the fiduciary duties of honesty, loyalty and silence owed directly to
Morgan Stanley & Co., and Kuhn & Loeb Co., and clients of those investment banks." Id. at
16. In addition, the indictment charged Courtois, Newman, and Carniol with "defrauding
and engaging in acts which operated as a fraud and deceit on Morgan Stanley & Co. and
Kuhn & Loeb Co., and on corporations and shareholders on whose behalf Morgan Stanley &
Co. or Kuhn & Loeb Co. was acting." Id. Newman also was indicted for aiding and abetting a
violation of the mail fraud statute, and for conspiring to violate the mail fraud statute. Id. at
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud statute). The other defendants, Courtois, Carniol, and
Spyropoulos, were not within the jurisdiction of the court, having left the United States.
United States v. Courtois [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,287,
n. 1. Antoniu, an unindicted co-conspirator, cooperated with the government. Id. at 91,288.
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New York, however, dismissed the counts in the indictment alleging a
violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 because no clear and definite
statement proscribing Newman's conduct existed in federal securities
law or in judicial opinions to indicate to a person of ordinary intelligence
that the conduct was unlawful. 1 The court found that the '34 Act, SEC
rules, and court decisions all failed to state clearly that improperly ac-
quiring confidential information creates a duty to disclose the informa-
tion to the other party to a securities transaction.2 The three factors
that supported the court's conclusion were the SEC's explicit rejection
of rule 10b-5's applicability to the analogous situation of warehousing,3
the absence of references to rule 10b-5 in SEC releases setting forth pro-
31 Id. at 91,301. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court
rejected the Second Circuit's imposition of a duty to disclose upon anyone who regularly
receives material non-public information. Id. at 235 n. 20; see note 17, supra. In addition to
being inconsistent with the Court's view that only a relationship of trust and confidence
creates a duty to disclose, the Second Circuit's holding was flawed because the suggestion
that certain undefined activities are generally prohibited by section 10(b) would raise ques-
tions whether criminal or civil defendants have fair notice that their conduct is illegal. Id.
See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). Grayned described as
basic the principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined. Id. at 108-09. The Court stated that laws should give a person of or-
dinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he can act
accordingly. Id. at 108. The district court in Courtois asserted that statutory language, prior
judicial custom, and usage must clearly define the proscribed conduct to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process. See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at
91,289. See also United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1975 (to uphold a
criminal conviction conduct proscribed must be clearly defined).
The district court also dismissed the counts in the indictment alleging mail fraud. [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98, 024, at 91,301. The court found that the in-
dictment lacked a necessary allegation of tangible economic harm, actual or contemplated,
to the investment banking firms or to the acquiring corporations. Id. The court found no
economic harm to the acquiring corporations resulting from the trading activity based on
misappropriated information. Id. Moreover, the court found no economic harm to the invest-
ment banking firms resulting from the decline in their business reputations due to the
employee's misappropriation of confidential information. Id. at 91,301 n. 22.
Because the court dismissed the substantive counts alleging violations of the mail fraud
statute and section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the court also dismissed the conspiracy count. Id. at
91,301. A conspiracy count will not lie under 18 U.S.C. § 371 if the actions forming the sub-
ject matter of the conspiracy are not substantive crimes. See United States v. Galardi, 476
F.2d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 839 (1973).
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,290.
Id. at 91,292-94. Warehousing occurs when an acquiring corporation divulges infor-
mation about an impending takeover to institutional investors in order to secure allies and
financing for the the takeover. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into
the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 811-12 (1973).
The district court in Newman noted that warehousing and misappropriation of confidential
information are similar because both involve trading on nonpublic information by persons
unaffiliated with the target corporation. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,293. The court reasoned that the SEC refused to extend rule 10b-5 to
warehousing because the trader in a warehousing situation is not affiliated with the target
corporation and has no relationship of trust and confidence with the target corporation or
[Vol. 39:969
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posals for the adoption of rule 14e-3,3 ' and reliance on traditional insider
analysis in judicial opinions and SEC enforcement actions.3 5 The court
also held that, apart from creating a duty to disclose, the acts of misap-
propriating confidential information were not in themselves deceptive
practices violating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.1' The district court
its shareholders. Id. The district court concluded that a person of ordinary intelligence
reasonably would not have known that trading on misappropriated information is unlawful
because an institutional investor can trade on the same information which an acquiring cor-
poration has voluntarily provided. Id. at 91,293.
1 [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,290. The SEC pro-
mulgated rule 14e-3 under the authority of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Sec-
tion 14(e) proscribes engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in
connection with any tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) grants the SEC
power to define and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and prac-
tices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. Id. Rule 14e-3 promulgated thereunder
provides that a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act violating section 14(e) occurs when
one in possession of material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer, acquired
directly or indirectly from the offering person, the issuer of the target securities, or any
person acting on behalf of an offering person or an issuer, purchases or sells a security sub-
ject to the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981). Rule 14e-3 did not apply to
Newman's conduct because the SEC had not yet promulgated rule 14e-3. 664 F.2d at 16 n. 3.
The district court stated that the SEC did not view rule 10b-5 as prohibiting Newman's
conduct because the SEC in 1973 asked for public comment as to whether persons with non-
public knowledge about existing or future markets in particular securities should disclose
the nonpublic information before trading. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024, at 91,294. The court also noted that none of the Exchange Act releases relating to
the adoption of rule 14e-3, with one limited exception, indicated that rule 10b-5 proscribed
trading on nonpublic market information. See id.; Exchange Act Release No. 15548 (Feb. 15,
1979) (rule 10b-5 provides basis for judicial consideration of person trading on knowledge of
bidder's intention to make tender offer). Moreover, *the court attached significance to the
remarks of the chairman of the ABA Subcommittee on Broker-Dealer Matters and the
remarks of the chairman on Broker-Dealer Matters and the remarks of the chairman of the
ABA Subcommittee on rule 10b-5 that the SEC should establish guidelines as to disclosure
requirements for "outside facts." [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at
91,294. See ABA Comment Letter on Material, Nonpublic Information, reprinted in Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (No. 233) D-1, at D-6 (Jan. 2, 1974). The district court viewed the inquiries
concerning the need for new regulations as an indication to a reasonable person that rule
10b-5 was not applicable to trading on nonpublic information not derived from the issuer of
the stock purchased or sold. See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024 at
91,294.
1 Id. at 91,295. The government claimed that four judicial opinions should have in-
dicated to Newman that his conduct was unlawful: Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc.,
381 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Shapiro,
349 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Sorg Printing Co.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,034, at 97,612 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The
district court, however, found that Crane, Geon Industries, and Shapiro all based the duty
to disclose on traditional insider trading concepts and that Sorg Printing Co. never even
considered the issue of rule 10b-5 liability. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,024, at 91,295.
1 Id. at 91,295. The government argued that judicial authority supported its assertion
that misappropriation can be fraud within the meaning of rule 10b-5. Id. See Superintendent
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acknowledged that a misappropriation of securities or the proceeds from
a sale of securities can constitute fraudulent conduct violating section
10(b) and rule 10b-53 7 but held that Courtois' and Antoniu's misap-
propriations of confidential information were merely breaches of an
agent's fiduciary duty of loyalty and ethical behavior and not actionable
fraud under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5.1' Since the breaches of duty did
not damage the investment banking firms or the acquiring corporations
in their capacity as future investors, the court held that state corporate
law and not federal securities law should govern the breaches of
fiduciary duty. 9 The district court also stated that the scheme could not
amount to a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 because the invest-
ment banking firms and their corporate clients were not purchasers or
sellers of securities."
of Ins. v. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. 6 (1971); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir.
1977); A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Allico Nat. Corp. v. Meat Cut-
ters and Butcher Workmen, 397 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1968). The district court, however,
asserted that the schemes in the government's suggested case authority were fraudulent
under any definition of "fraud." [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at
91,295. The court suggested that Newman's scheme was not fraudulent because the scheme




40 Id. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme
Court held that in a civil action for money damages a plaintiff must be either a purchaser or
seller of a security to have standing to sue. Id. at 730-31. The three principal classes of plain-
tiffs that the purchaser-seller requirements bars are potential purchasers who decide not to
purchase because of a misrepresentation or omission of favorable information, actual
shareholders who decide not to sell because of a misrepresentation or omission of un-
favorable information, and shareholders and creditors who suffer loss in the value of their
investment due to a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. at 737-38. The Supreme
Court considered three factors in adopting a purchaser-seller requirement. Id. at 751-55.
First, the court placed importance on lower courts' acceptance of a purchaser-seller require-
ment and Congress' failure to broaden section 10(b). Id. at 751. Second, the Court found a
purchaser-seller requirement consistent with Congress' express creation of remedies for
purchasers and sellers coupled with its express creation of remedies for nonpurchasers and
nonsellers when Congress believed the remedies to be necessary. Id. at 752-54. Third,
unable to determine the statutory intent of Congress, the Court decided on the basis of
"policy considerations" that relaxation of the purchaser-seller requirement would lead to
vexatious litigation where proof turns on uncorroboratable oral testimony. Id. at 754-55.
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip Stamps, most circuits had acopted an
exception to the purchaser-seller requirement for a plaintiff in a suit for an injunction. See,
e.g., Candy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973); James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d
944, 947 (6th Cir. 1973); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1973); City Nat'l
Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 228 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). In Blue
Chip Stamps, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the injunction exception applies to
private litigants, but the Court stressed that the case was one for money damages and
stated that the SEC could bring an injunction regardless of the purchaser-seller require-
ment. 421 U.S. at 725, 727, 730, 752 n. 15. After Blue Chip Stamps, courts have continued to
recognize the injunction exception to the purchaser-seller requirement. See note 65 infra.




On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's order dismissing the indictment.4 ' The court
ruled that while the purchaser-seller requirement establishes standing
to bring a private cause of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the
purchaser-seller requirement is inapplicable in a criminal action.4 The
Newman court indicated that the judicial purchaser-seller limitation im-
posed in private rights of action under rule 10b-5 is appropriate only
because the private right of action is judicially created.4" The court
asserted, however, that standing is not relevant to the scope of rule
10b-5 when the SEC brings suit"' or when the United States brings a
criminal action4' to enforce the rule. The court concluded that Newman
reasonably should have known that courts would not impose a
purchaser-seller requirement in a criminal action because courts
previously had not imposed a purchaser-seller requirement in suits for
injunctive relief4 7 and because the actual language of the rule contains no
purchaser-seller requirement.48
The Newman court did not address the issue whether the act of
misappropriating confidential information gives rise to a duty to disclose
the information.49 Instead, the court held that the scheme to misap-
propriate confidential information in itself was a deceptive practice
amounting to fraud. 0 The court reasoned that had the conspirators used
similar deceptive practices to misappropriate cash or securities the con-
duct would be clearly fraudulent." Moreover, the conspirators' conduct
" 664 F.2d at 14.
2 Id. at 17; see note 41, supra.
'1 664 F.2d at 17; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737,
749 (1975) (courts may limit or expand portions of private right of action based on policy con-
siderations since congressional enactments and administrative regulations are inconclusive).
" Section 21 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976), authorizes the SEC to enjoin any
violations of the '34 Act or any rule and regulations promulgated thereunder.
" Section 32 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976), provides that any person who
willfully violates any provision of the '34 Act or any rule or regulation thereunder shall if
convicted be fined up to $10,000, or imprisoned for more than five years, or both.
664 F.2d at 17.
"Id.; see note 65 supra.
664 F.2d at 17.
' See id.
Id.
Id. (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-11
(1971); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1027 (6th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 338-40 (2d Cir. 1977); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226
F. Supp. 972, 977-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)). In Bankers Life, the Supreme Court held that a
scheme designed to misappropriate the proceeds from a corporation's sale of securities was
fraud within the meaning of section 10(b). See 404 U.S. at 10. The Court stated that misap-
propriation is a "garden variety of fraud." 404 U.S. at 10 n. 7. In Mansbach, the plaintiff
sought to regain 300 corporate bonds he had pledged as collateral for anticipated transac-
tions with a securities broker-dealer. 598 F.2d at 1019. The plaintiff paid his debt to the
broker-dealer and demanded a return of the bonds, but the broker-dealer would not return
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defrauded the investment banking firms of their reputations as safe
repositories of client confidences 2 Additionally, the Newman court
asserted that the scheme to misappropriate confidential information
"wronged" the acquiring corporations whose takeover plans depended
upon stock prices fixed by market forces, not prices artificially inflated
by purchases based upon confidential information. 3 The court concluded
that Newman reasonably should have known that his conduct was
unlawful since a fiduciary's misappropriation of information is unlawful
in other areas of the law, 4 and Newman could not have expected Con-
gress to establish a less rigorous code of conduct under the federal
securities laws.
5 5
Having concluded that Newman's conduct was a deceptive practice
the bonds until plaintiff signed a release absolving the broker-dealer of liability in connec-
tion with plaintiff's option trading. Id. at 1021. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the broker-dealer's conversion of the corporate bonds could con-
stitute a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. at 1027. In Brown, defendants devised a
scheme to dupe a transfer agent into issuing replacement securities for counterfeit
securities. 555 F.2d at 339. Holding the scheme to be a violation of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit characterized as fraud the
conversion of stock by counterfeit and forgery. Id. In Cooper, a lending institution made
loans to plaintiff to finance a purchase of securities. 226 F. Supp. at 975. Plaintiff and the
lending institution agreed that some of the securities would be delivered to a trust company
to be held as collateral for loans to plaintiff. Id. Subsequently, the trust company and the
lending institution converted the securities and sold them. Id. Denying defendants' motion
to dismiss, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
a scheme devised to convert stock is within the coverage of rule 10b-5. Id. at 978.
52 664 F.2d at 17. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.
1971); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-82, 248 N.E.2d 910,
912-13 (1969). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit upheld a district court's order that defendants make restitution of their profits from in-
sider trading to an escrow account to be held for the benefit of any interested person. 446
F.2d at 1307. At the end of five years the remainder of the fund would go to the corporation
from which the insider obtained the inside information. Id. The defendants argued that the
corporation should not receive restitution since defendants' conduct had not injured the cor-
poration. Id. at 1308. The Second Circuit, however, held that a corporation can suffer an in-
jury when the effect of an insider's abuse of his position in the corporation is to "'cast a
cloud on the corporation's name, injure stockholder relations and undermind public regard
for the corporation's securities.'" Id. (quoting Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499,
301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81-82, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912-3 (1969)).
664 F.2d at 17.
5' Id. at 18. (citing United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.) (conversion of names of
government agents violation 18 U.S.C. § 641, unauthorized sale of government property),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1969); United States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1979)
(employee's conversion of geophysical data from oil company violated 18 U.S.C. § 1341, mail
fraud statute), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310,
313-14 (5th Cir. 1956) (same); United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921, 926-27 (2d Cir.) (conver-
sion of trust funds violated 18 U.S.C. § 88, then mail fraud statute), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
669 (1940)).
Id. (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774-77 (1979); Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971); A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375
F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1967)).
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under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the court examined the issue whether
the fraudulent conduct occurred "in connection with" a purchase or sale
of securities. 6 Since Newman's sole purpose in participating in the
scheme was to purchase securities in corporations that were takeover
targets, the court held that the fraud was sufficiently connected to a sale
of securities." Moreover, the court emphasized that the connection need
only be tenuous, and that the "in connection with" requirement does not
limit protection under the federal securities statutes only to investors."
Finally, the court reasoned that holding Newman criminally liable for his
misconduct would further the congressional goal underlying the federal
securities laws of promoting high standards of business ethics
throughout the securities industry. 9
The Newman court correctly refused to impose a purchaser-seller re-
quirement in a criminal enforcement action under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5.60 The Supreme Court has imposed a purchaser-seller requirement
only in a judicially implied private action for damages and not in an ex-
press enforcement provision of the '34 Act.' The Supreme Court imposed
the purchaser-seller requirement in private damage actions because of
the policy consideration of wanting to reduce vexatious litigation where
proof of a potential purchase or sale of securities would depend upon un-
corroboratable oral testimony. 2 Since Congress expressly authorized
SEC injunctive actions and criminal enforcement actions, however, the
language and legislative history of the statutory provisions, and not
policy considerations, should govern the requisite elements of injunctive
and criminal actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.6 ' The statutory
1 664 F.2d at 18.
57 Id.
5Id.
IId. at 1819 (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979)). The Newman
court also reinstated the counts in the indictment alleging mail fraud. Id. at 20. Because
Courtois and Antoniu were under an obligation to report their buying activity and because
they falsely and fraudulently asserted that they maintained no direct or indirect interests in
securities trading accounts, the court found a sufficient allegation of mail fraud. Id. at 19-20.
The court also held that the scheme to misappropriate confidential information was no mere
breach of fiduciary duty, but was more egregious since its object was to steal valuable prop-
erty (the confidential information) from the employer. Id. at 19. Additionally, the court re-
jected the district court's holding that an allegation of direct, tangible harm, actual or con-
templated, is a necessary element to establish mail fraud. Id. at 20. Yet, even assuming the
need for proof of direct, tangible economic harm, either actual or contemplated, the court
found that the investment banking firm and its clients surely would suffer an injury if the
secrecy surrounding the tender offers were fraudulently lifted. Id. Having reinstated both
substantive counts, the court reinstated the conspiracy. Id.
See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
, See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975); note 40
supra.
" See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975); note 40 supra.
" See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (statutory language and
legislative history of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 should control interpretation); Blue Chip
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language and legislative history of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are devoid
of any reference to a purchaser-seller requirement." The very absence of
any reference to a purchaser-seller requirement in the statutory
language and legislative history of section 10(b) indicates that Congress
did not intend the requirement to be an element of an injunctive or
criminal action. Furthermore, courts traditionally have refused to find a
need for a purchaser-seller requirement in injunctive or criminal actions
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 5
In Newman, the Second Circuit found the conspirators' acts of
misappropriating confidential information to be a violation of rule
10b-5.6" The Newman court, however, did not clearly indicate whether
the conspirators' conduct would have been a deceptive practice if they
had not traded on the confidential information. Prior cases holding
misappropriations to be actionable under rule 10b-5 generally have in-
volved the misappropriation of tangible objects such as cash or
securities where the act of misappropriation clearly occurs upon taking
possession of the physical object.61 Information, however, is intangible.
The conspirators in Newman would not have misappropriated the infor-
mation merely by possessing, by knowing the information. Rather, the
act of trading on the information established that the conspirators con-
verted the information to their own use.
In Chiarella v. United States, however, the Supreme Court held that
a criminal defendant who had misappropriated confidential information
relating to a tender offer did not violate rule 10b-5 by trading on that in-
formation because he did not owe a fiduciary duty to the target corpora-
tion shareholders who sold to him.68 The Chiarella Court emphasized
that the criminal defendant did not have a duty to disclose to his sellers
because only a fiduciary duty owed to the other party to a securities
transaction and not mere possession of nonpublic information creates a
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (statutory language and legislative
history of section 10b-5 and rule 10b-5 did not indicate clearly that purchaser-seller require-
ment should be element of private action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
See note 2 supra; 5 JACOBS, supra, note 14, pt. 1, at § 5.
See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1976) (need for documentation
of potential purchase or sale is not critical in suit for injunction); United States v. Charnay,
537 F.2d 341, 349 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1976) (standing to sue is not an issue in criminal action);
United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 288 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1975) (Blue Chip Stamps did not
make purchaser-seller requirement an element of rule 10b-5 criminal violation); Thomas v.
Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 590 (3d Cir. 1975) (purchaser-seller requirement unnecessary in
suit for injunction since injunction prevents future violation from occurring).
"' See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
67 See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1971)
(misappropriation of proceeds from sale of securities); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,
598 F.2d 1017, 1019 (6th Cir. 1979) (conversion of bonds); United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d
336, 338-40 (2d Cir. 1977) (conversion of stock); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F.
Supp. 972, 977-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (conversion of securities); note 52 supra.
' See 445 U.S. at 230; note 17 supra.
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duty to disclose. 9 In contrast to the Supreme Court's holding in
Chiarella, the Newman court held that the conspirators violated rule
10b-5 by trading on confidential information even though they owed no
fiduciary duty to their sellers.7° Yet, Newman is not inconsistent with
Chiarella because the Newman court did not hold that the conspirators
had a duty to disclose to their sellers.7' The Newman court instead held
that the conspirators violated rule 10b-5 when they misappropriated con-
fidential information by trading in securities on the basis of that infor-
mation.2 Newman stands for the proposition that mere possession of
confidential information can impose a duty to abstain from trading,
because to trade on the information is to misappropriate the informa-
tion, and misappropriation is a deceptive practice violating rule 10b-5.7'
The Newman court's indication that mere possession of confidential
information imposes a duty to abstain from trading significantly
broadens the scope of liability for insider trading under rule 10b-5. While
corporate insiders may not always owe a fiduciary duty to the other party
to a securities transaction,74 a corporate insider generally will owe a duty
to the corporate source of the information not to use the information for
personal gain.7 5 When one in possession of confidential information owes
such a duty to the source of the information, any unauthorized act of
trading on the information will constitute an act of misappropriation.
After Newman, trading while in mere possession of confidential informa-
tion can violate rule 10b-5.
Because Newman was a criminal action under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5, Newman does not provide direct guidance on the applicability of
the misappropriation theory of liability to private actions for damages
under rule 10b-5. In a criminal action, the government need not prove
that an actual economic injury occurred7" or that the victims of a
fraudulent scheme were purchasers or sellers of any security.77 In a
private action for damages, however, a plaintiff must prove an actual
economic injury 8 and must attain standing to sue under rule 10b-5 as an
" See id. at 226-30.
70 See 664 F.2d at 15-16.
71 See id. at 17.
72 See id. at 17.
, See note 52 supra.
" See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-235 (1980).
,5 See United States v. Chiarella, 544 F.2d 1358, 1368 n. 14 (2d Cir. 1978) (agent owes
fiduciary duty to principal to respect confidences), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 222
(1980); RESTATEMENT (2d) AGENCY § 395 (1956).
" See United States v. Johnson, 496 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th Cir. 1974) (in criminal action
only showing of potential injury, not actual injury, is necessary); United States v. Peltz, 433
F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1970) (actual injury is not an element of violation of rule 10b-5 in criminal
action), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
" See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1981); note 65 supra.
7 See Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 528 (9th Cir. 1976) (in
private action for damages plaintiff must show actual loss); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
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actual purchaser or seller of a security.79 The Newman court indicated
that the investment banking firms and their corporate clients had sus-
tained an actual economic injury resulting from the conspirators' con-
duct." The conspirators not only damaged the reputation of the invest-
ment banking firms but also interfered with the corporate clients'
takeover plans by trading in target corporation stock, thereby causing
the price of the target stock to rise." Yet even if both the investment
banking firms and their corporate clients sustained an economic injury,
if the corporate clients, who purchased securities in tender offers, were
the only purchasers of securities, only they would have standing to sue
the conspirators for damages. Even though the investment banking
firms were victims of the conspirators' deceptive conduct, if the invest-
ment banking firms did not purchase securities, they could not attain
standing to sue and could not recover from the conspirators in a private
action for damages. Also, if a miniscule rise in the price of target com-
pany stock due to sporadic trading on confidential information is the only
amount that an acquiring corporation could recover, a lawsuit to recover
that slight amount of damages might not be justifiable. Thus, the ra-
tionale of Newman may have significance only in the context of a
criminal or injunctive action where proof of damages and the purchaser-
seller requirement are irrelevant.
Although the shareholders of the target corporation that sold
securities to the conspirators could satisfy the purchaser-seller require-
ment and attain standing to sue,8 they could not recover from the con-
*792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970) (in private action for damages plaintiff must suffer legal injury of
type rule 10b-5 is meant to prevent). See also section 28(a) of the '84 Act, which limits
damages to actual loss in any private action for damages brought under the provisions of
the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77bb(a) (1976).
" See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975) (in private
action for damages a plaintiff must have purchased or sold a security to have standing to
sue).
8 See 664 F.2d at 20; note 59 supra.
664 F.2d at 17-18.
82 See O'Connor & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98, 443, at 92,627. In O'Connor, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that sellers of call options could attain standing
to sue in a factual situation similar to that in United States v. Newman. Id. In O'Connor,
O'Connor & Associates (O'Connor) sold call options on the stock of Amax, Inc. (Amax) before
the announcement of a tender offer by Standard Oil of California (Socal) for the stock of
Amax. Id. at 92,623. O'Connor alleged that the registered representatives in Amax call op-
tions, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (DWRI), A. G. Becker, Inc. (Becker), and unknown
customers of the registered representatives had purchased call options from O'Connor
while in possession of inside information concerning the impending takeover attempts. Id.
Because O'Connor had alleged that insiders of Amax, the issuer, had tipped inside informa-
tion, the O'Connor court held that Chiarella would not bar recovery. Id. The court also held
that the rationale of Newman could provide a basis for recovery. Id. at 92,626. The court
reasoned that the insiders of the acquiring corporation owed a duty to the corporation not
to trade on inside information. Id. Yet, because it would be nonsensical to require the in-
[Vol. 39:969
10b-5 DEVELOPMENTS
spirators under the rationale of Chiarella because the conspirators did
not defraud them.' The conspirators owed their sellers no fiduciary duty
and thus no duty to disclose.8 4 One recent court, however, has inter-
preted Newman as permitting the sellers of the target corporation
securities in Newman to recover from the conspirators. 5 The court viewed
Newman as imposing a duty on one who has misappropriated confiden-
tial information to disclose or abstain from trading.86 The implications of
Newman, however, militate strongly against permitting recovery by the
sellers of target corporation securities. The Newman court did not ex-
pressly hold that the conspirators had a duty to disclose to their sellers."
Moreover, the Newman court indicated that the conspirators owed a
fiduciary duty to the investment banking firms and their corporate
clients to keep the information confidential, in other words, not to
disclose the information to anyone.8 The conspirators' violation of rule
10b-5, under the rationale of Newman, consisted of stealing information,
not of failing to disclose information. 9 Because the conspirators in
Newman did not steal information from their sellers, they did not
defraud their sellers under the rationale of Newman. Although Newman
does not provide direct support for a theory of liability that would per-
mit the sellers of target corporation securities to recover damages,
courts may attempt to extend Newman to permit such recovery. Such an
interpretation would be consistent with Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Chiarella, which argued that any unlawful acquisition of information
should impose a duty to disclose the information before trading.
Newman is an important advance in rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. The
Newman court was innovative in holding that an act of trading on con-
fidential information is an act of misappropriating the information. Prior
case law under rule 10b-5 had proscribed misappropriation of cash or
securities but had not established that trading on confidential informa-
siders to disclose to the acquiring corporations, which already knew the' information, the
O'Connor court asserted that the insiders had a duty to disclose to their sellers of call op-
tions. Id. The O'Connor court's interpretation of Newman suggests that mere possession of
insider information imposes a duty to disclose or abstain from trading. See id. at 92,626-27.
But see note 15 supra (Chiarella v. United States indicated that mere possession of inside
information does not create duty to disclose).
'3See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15-16.
See United States v. Courtois, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
98,024 at 91,291 (district court opinion in United States v. Newman) (conspirators owed no
fiduciary duty to target corporations or sellers of target corporation stock), rev'd on other
grounds, 664 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981).
" See O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean'Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,443, at 92,626-27; note 82 supra.
6Id.
See 664 F.2d at 17.
"Id.
",Id.
11 See note 19 supra.
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tion is a misappropriation of that information actionable under rule
10b-5.9 The effect of Newman is to shift the focus for establishing liability
under rule 10b-5 from a duty to the other party to a securities transac-
tion to a duty to the source of nonpublic information. To trade on con-
fidential information is to defraud the source of that information.9" After
Newman, mere possession of confidential information can impose a duty
to abstain from trading.
II. CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
A corporation can violate section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by making a
misleading statement93 or by failing to correct an accurate statement
that has since become inaccurate.94 Some courts have suggested,
however, that a corporation should be under a general duty to disclose
corporate information promptly when the information is complete and
verified and when no valid business reason exists to justify non-
disclosure.95 Additionally, some courts have suggested that a corporation
9' See note 67 supra.
See 664 F.2d at 17.
9' See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
"' See Ross v. A. H. Robins & Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (corporation
has duty to correct accurate disclosure that has since become inaccurate), rev'd on other
grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). Cf. SEC v. Century In-
vestment Transfer Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CRH) 93,232, at
91,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (where company failed to announce lapse of previously announced
merger negotiations, corporate officer enjoined from trading under rule lOb-5).
15 See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519
(10th Cir. 1973) (corporation should disclose promptly information when accurate and ripe);
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 100 (10th Cir.) (unless valid business pur-
pose for nondisclosure, disclosure required when information available and ripe for release),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), and cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972; Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting)
(prompt disclosure required when information is likely to be used by insiders); SEC v. North
Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 79 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1970) (corporation risks liability
when it fails to disclose important information); United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670,
705, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (corporation need not disclose if valid business purpose requires
secrecy); see generally 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 6.11, at 138.401 (1977); 5A
JACOBS, supra note 14, pt. 4, § 88.04[b]; Allen, The Disclosure Obiligation of Publicly Held
Corporations in the Absence of Insider Trading, 25 MERCER L. REV. 479 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Allen]; Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporations Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67
GEo. L.J. 935 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bauman].
A duty to disclose corporate information promptly may arise from stock exchange
rules. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 162 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1980). The New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) both require
listed corporations to release material information promptly to the public when the informa-
tion is available for release. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § A2, at
A-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as COMPANY MANUAL]; AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY
GUIDE §§ 401-406 & app. 1, at 299 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPANY GUIDE]. The NYSE
does not make the duty to disclose a part of the listing agreement, but the Company Manual
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is under an obligation to correct material misstatements of outsiders to
the corporation" and to correct rumors circulating in the marketplace. 7
Recently, however, the Second Circuit, in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers,
Inc.,98 and in State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp.,99 rejected
the view that a corporation has a duty to correct or verify information
not attributable to the corporation.10
In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., Liggett & Myers, Inc. (Liggett)
initiated a program to encourage closer contact between securities
analysts and company management to remedy a perceived deficiency in
the financial community's valuation of Liggett stock.'0' As part of the
program to correct any errors or misunderstandings concerning Liggett,
Liggett officials discussed Liggett's operations with securities analysts
states that timely disclosure is one of the most important and fundamental purposes of the
agreement. COMPANY MANUAL, supra, at A-18. The AMEX, however, includes the duty in
both the listing agreement and in the Company Guide. COMPANY GUIDE, supra, at § 401 &
app. 1, at 299. The AMEX permits a corporation to refrain from immediate disclosure when
adequate secrecy can be maintained or when immediate release might prejudice the ability
of the corporation to pursue its corporate objectives or when the facts are in a state of flux
and a more appropriate moment for disclosure is imminent. COMPANY GUIDE, supra, § 403(1),
at 104. See generally 5A JACOBS, supra, note 14, pt. 4, § 93; Bauman, supra, at 976-88. See
note 144 infra (discussing private right of action under stock exchange rules).
" See Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ore. 1973) (corporation has duty
to correct misstatement of broker-dealer well-known as underwriter of corporation's stock);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (duty to correct
misstatements exists when failure to correct misleading statements may mislead investors);
2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 6.11, at 138.401 (1977). 5A JACOBS, supra note 14,
pt. 4, § 88.04[b], at 17; Dayan, Correcting Errors in the Press, 7 REv. SEC. REG. 941, 942-44
(April 6, 1972). But see Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d
937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969) (under SEC rule 14e-3 corporation has no duty to correct material
misstatement in newspaper); Hutto v. Texas Income Prop. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 478, 482 (S.D.
Tex. 1976) (directors have no duty to correct unsigned newspaper account of which they had
no detailed knowledge and which would not have induced "blind" reliance). The AMEX and
NYSE impose a duty upon listed corporations to affirmatively deny inaccurate rumors and
to disclose facts to explain the situation. See COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 95, § 403, at
108-09; COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 95, at A-23.
I See SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Co., 424 F.2d 63, 79 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1970) (cor-
poration should issue press release to squelch rumors); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
309 F. Supp. 548, 562 (D. Utah 1970) (court left issue open regarding duty to halt rumors),
modified sub nom., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971), and cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); 5A JACOBS, supra note 14, pt. 4, §
88.04, at 21 (policies underlying rule lOb-5 suggest that corporation has duty to correct false
rumor); Fleischer, Corporate Disclosure/Insider Trading, 45 HARV. BUS. REV. 129, 133 (1967)
(corporation should issue press release when rumors abound); Shade, Duties of Publicly
Held Corporations Under the Federal Securities Laws, 26 Bus. LAWYER 497, 504 (1970) (cor-
poration probably has duty to correct rumors originating outside corporation).
"' 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
" 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981).
10 See text accompanying notes 112-140 infra.
"' 635 F.2d at 159. Liggett & Myers, Inc. (Liggett) is a diversified company listed on
the New York Stock Exchange. Id. Liggett's businesses include tobacco, liquor imports, pet
food, cereal, watchbanks, cleansers, and rugs. Id.
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and commented on the factual content of reports that securities analysts
were preparing.' Since 1971 had been a record year for Liggett and the
earnings of Liggett for the first quarter of 1972 were very favorable,
many securities analysts predicted that 1972 earnings would increase
ten percent over 1971 earnings."' Although Liggett's internal budget
projections predicted only a two percent increase, Liggett's manage-
ment initially took no action to correct the favorable earnings predic-
tions of the analysts."4 After a sharp decline in April earnings, Liggett
revised its internal earnings projections further downward."5 Although
Liggett's management thereafter adopted a more negative tone with
securities analysts, Liggett made no immediate public disclosure of the
adverse financial data.0 0 In late June of 1972, the price of Liggett stock
began to decline steadily."7 Finally, on July 18, 1972 Liggett released a
preliminary earnings statement for June and a six-month earnings state-
ment which revealed that Liggett's earnings for 1972 would be down
from the previous year's earnings."0 Subsequently, Arnold Elkind, who
had purchased 100 shares of Liggett common stock before the press
release correcting the earlier projections, brought a class action for
damages against Liggett alleging that Liggett's failure to correct the op-
timistic predictions of the securities analysts constituted a violation of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5."'
102 Id.
13 Id. Liggett's earnings in 1971 were $4.22 per share, up from $3.56 in 1970. Id. The
first quarter earnings for 1972 were $1.00 per share compared with $.81 for the first quarter
of 1971. Id. At meetings with securities analysts during February and March of 1972, Lig-
gett officials noted that Liggett was making "good progress" and that company was "well-
positioned" to take advantage of industry trends. Id. In late March, Liggett successfully
issued $50 million of debentures to the public. Id. Until early June Liggett officials
sporadically made vague but favorable pronouncements concerning Liggett's prospects for
1972. Id. at 160.
104 Id.
"I Id. Liggett's April earnings were only $.03 per share compared to $.30 the previous
April. Id. The company reduced its 1972 earnings projections from $4.30 to $3.95 per share.
Id. The Elkind court stated that Liggett's internal projection of a 2% increase in earnings
was not necessarily inconsistent with the projections of the securities analysts since sound
budgeting procedures call for conservative projections. Id. at 160 n. 3. The Liggett court




o' Id. Liggett's June 1972 earnings were $.20 per share compared with $.44 in June of
1971. Id. The board of directors learned on June 19 that May 1972 earnings had rebounded
from the April decline to $.23 per share compared to $.27 in may of 1971 and original projec-
tions of $.34. Id. The earnings for April and May of 1972 did not indicate, however, that Lig-
gett's 1972 earnings would reach the predictions of the securities analysts. See id. The earn-
ings for the first half of 1972 were approximately $1.46 per share, down from $1.82 in 1971.
Id.
log See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In
Elkind, plaintiff also alleged that officials at Liggett had tipped material inside information
to securities analysts. Id.
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the count in plaintiffs complaint alleging that Liggett's
failure to disclose the internal predictions of earnings was a violation of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5." ° Subsequently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.'
The Second Circuit held that a corporation need not correct inaccurate
statements of persons unconnected with the corporation unless the inac-
curate statements are attributable to the corporation."' The court
... Id. at 126. The district court in Elkind, however, held Liggett liable for two counts
of tipping material inside information to securities analysts. Id. at 128. On July 10, 1972, an
official at Liggett disclosed to a securities analyst that Liggett would issue a preliminary
earnings statement. Id. Also, on July 17, 1972, an official at Liggett affirmatively responded
to a securities analyst's question whether Liggett's earnings would be down. Id. The district
court held Liggett liable to all persons who traded from July 11 to July 18 without
knowledge of the selectively disclosed information. Id. at 129.
"1 635 F.2d at 162-64. The Second Circuit in Elkind reversed the district court's finding
that officials at Liggett had tipped material information on July 10, but the court affirmed
the district court's holding that Liggett officials had tipped material information on July 17.
Id. at 165-67. The court held that while the statement on July 10 that Liggett would issue a
preliminary earnings report was unprecedented, the statement did not indicate what the
earnings would be and, therefore, was not material. Id. at 166. The court held, however, that
a Liggett official's affirmative response to a securities analyst's question whether earnings
would be down and a request to keep the information confidential made the information
material. Id. at 165. The Second Circuit held Liggett liable to all traders who purchased
securities from July 17 to 18 without knowledge of the undisclosed information. Id. at 168.
See Note, 10b-5 Developments-Damages- and Contribution, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
_ (1982) (discussing measure of damages in Elkind).
"' 635 F.2d at 163. The Elkind court stated that even if a duty to correct erroneous in-
formation not attributable to the corporation existed, such a duty to correct might not ex-
tend to correcting projections substantially differing from a company's internal projections.
Id. at 163 n. 11. Projections of corporate earnings are different from other information such
as dividend declarations or potential mergers because earnings projections, based on facts
and assumptions subject to constant change, are inherently uncertain. See Bauman, supra
note 95, at 972. Thus, earnings projections by their very nature arguably would never be
ripe for disclosure. Id. at 973. Many corporations, fearing liability if actual results differ
from projections, resist disclosing sales and earnings projections. Id. At least one court has
held that a corporation must exercise a high degree of care in disclosing assumptions
underlying a projection. See Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But see
Schuller v. Slick Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,065, at
97,736, 97,739 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (corporation not liable for release of inaccurate earnings pro-
jections where inaccuracy not due to recklessness); Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 676
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (no liability when documents used in formulating earnings projections
prepared and reviewed in reasonable manner). In light of the uncertain nature of sales and
earnings projections, the SEC requires that corporations disclose projections publicly, only
if the projections have been selectively disclosed to corporate outsiders. Exchange Act
Release No. 5581 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,167, at 85,299
(Apr. 28, 1975). Although the SEC initially refused to allow the use of earnings projections
in statutory filings because of the belief that projections are inherently unreliable, the SEC
now favors the disclosure of projections. See Securities Act Release No. 5992 [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,756, at 81,034 (Nov. 7, 1978); Securities Act
Release No. 5993 [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,757, at 81,041 (Nov. 7,
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stated, however, that a corporation can incur a duty to correct inac-
curate reports and earnings projections of securities analysts if a cor-
poration so involves itself in the preparation of the reports and earnings
projections as to impliedly represent that the reports and projections
are accurate."1 The court found no basis for reversing the district court's
finding that Liggett had not endorsed, expressly or impliedly, the
analysts' forecasts.' Although Liggett officials commented on the fac-
tual content of the securities analysts' reports, the officials complied
with the corporate policy of not commenting on earnings projects. "5
While Liggett officials corrected the factual content of the reports and
earnings projections, the officials did not indicate whether the reports or
earnings projections were consistent with Liggett's internal
projections."' Moreover, Liggett officials did not leave uncorrected any
factual statements that they knew or believed to be erroneous."7
Although the court concluded that Liggett incurred no liability for non-
disclosure, the court emphasized that any commenting on the reports of
securities analysts is fraught with danger, for management must neither
mislead stockholders by impliedly approving inaccurate information nor
tip nonpublic information to securities analysts by correcting erroneous
reports and projections." 8
In State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp.," the Second
Circuit reaffirmed the holding in Elkind that a corporation has no duty
to correct information not attributable to the corporation." ° In Fluor, the
South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) invited the Fluor
Corporation (Fluor), a worldwide engineering and construction company,
and two other large construction companies, to submit proposals on a $1
1978); SEC STAFF REPORT, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS, Ch. X, at 36, 37, 39 (1969) (Wheat Report). The AMEX
has relaxed the requirement that a listed corporation correct rumors when sales and earn-
ings projections are involved and generally does not require a corporation to respond to in-
accurate outside projections. COMPANY GUIDE, supra note 95, § 403, at 108-09. Yet, when a
projection manifestly is based on erroneous information or is wrongly attributed to the cor-
poration, a corporation must respond by correcting the erroneous information. Id. at 109.
Also, the corporation need not disclose its sales or earnings projections but may limit its
disclosure to a statement that the corporation has not made such a projection and knows of
no facts justifying such a projection. Id. The NYSE does not expressly distinguish between
the duty to correct rumors in general and the duty to correct rumors of sales and earnings
projections. See COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 95, at A-23; see generally Bauman, supra
note 95, at 972-76.






." 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981).
'' Id. at 850.
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billion coal gasification plant project (SASOL II) in South Africa."' On
February 25, 1974, SASOL informed Fluor that Fluor would receive the
SASOL II contract." One day later, Fluor and SASOL signed an agree-
ment which called for an embargo on all publicity concerning the selec-
tion of Fluor as the SASOL II contractor until March 10, 1975." On
March 4, however, numerous securities analysts contacted Fluor officials
to confirm rumors that Fluor had been awarded a contract for a major
project. 24 The officials refused to comment on the rumors."' The next
day a specialist in Fluor stock reported to Fluor officials speculation that
Fluor had won a large contract in the Middle East and that Fluor might
be the subject of a tender offer.'28 In addition, a securities analyst called
to ask whether Fluor had obtained the coal gasification contract in South
Africa."' Although the volume of trading in Fluor stock had increased
slightly on March 3, the volume of trading tripled and the price of Fluor
stock increased from $22 1/4 to $25 on March 6."' The sudden increase in
market activity led the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on
March 7." Three days after the suspension of trading, Fluor issued a
press release announcing the signing of the SASOL II contract."' Subse-
quently, State Teachers Retirement Board (State Teachers), a large
public pension fund which sold 288,257 shares of Fluor stock between
March 3 and March 6, brought suit for damages against Fluor alleging
that Fluor's failure to disclose the existence of the SASOL II contract
before March 10 constituted a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5."'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that Fluor had a duty to disclose the existence of the SASOL
II contract during the week of March 3.2 The court acknowledged that a
"I Id. at 846.
122 Id.
I Id. The publicity embargo permitted SASOL to complete delicate negotiations with
the French government for financing. Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
' Id. at 847.
27 Id.
" Id. The increases stock activity prompted a market analyst at the NYSE to contact a
member of Fluor's legal department to investigate the reason for the increased stock activity.
Id. A member of Fluor's legal department said he was unsure of the reasons for the increas-
ed market activity but offered three possible explanations. Id. First, Fluor had been notified
that an unidentified group wanted to purchase one million shares of Fluor stock. Id. Second,
Fluor had obtained the unannounced SASOL 11 contract. Id. Third, potential new jobs ex-
isted for Fluor in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Id. The NYSE market analyst indicated that the
Exchange might exercise its right to suspend trading in Fluor stock pending announcement
of the SASOL II contract. Id. The member of Fluor's legal department agreed with the pro-
posed trading halt. Id.
1" Id.
130 Id.
,8 Id. at 847, 849.
'" State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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corporation's duty to disclose usually arises only when a corporation is
trading on inside information or when a corporation had made a previous
inaccurate statement.'33 The court observed, however, that other courts,
including the Second Circuit, had suggested that a duty to disclose may
exist even in the absence of trading or a prior misleading disclosure.1"
Accordingly, the district court held that a violation of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 may arise from a failure to disclose material information when
rumors are rampant, the price of the corporation's stock is shooting up-
ward, and the corporation is in possession of all material facts. '35
The district court, however, tempered its decision that Fluor had a
duty to disclose by stating that liability should be imposed only upon a
showing that the failure to disclose was motivated by an intent to
deceive investors for the corporation's own gain.136 The court believed
that recklessness should not create liability because a recklessness stand-
ard would be inconsistent with the "business judgment rule" which pro-
tects officers and directors from liability when they made business decis-
ions in good faith.'37 Although the court believed that only intentional
1 Id. at 291-92. (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968)).
Although the district court in Fluor interpreted SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur to hold that a
corporation must disclose information to correct a prior misleading statement, the court in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur held that the defendant corporation violated section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 by making a misleading statement, not by failing to correct a prior misleading
statement. See 401 F.2d at 862. The district court offered no case support for the proposi-
tion that a corporation breaches section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by failing to correct a prior
misleading statement. See id. The breach, in fact, occurs when a corporation makes the
misrepresentation not when a corporation fails to correct it. See note 156 infra.
" 500 F. Supp. at 291-92. (citing Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 n. 10 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir. 1973)).
" Id. at 292.
Id. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 required scienter. Id. at 193. The court defined
scienter as an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. Id. The Court rejected the notion
that liability should follow wholly faultless conduct that happens to harm investors. Id. The
Court found no indicated that Congress intended liability to be imposed under § 10(b) unless
one acts other than in good faith. Id. at 206. The Court also found that the language of sec-
tion 10(b) implied an intent to proscribe intentional or will ful conduct designed to deceive or
defraud investors. Id. at 199. Although the Hochfelder Court did not determine whether
recklessness could satisfy the scienter requirement, recent lower federal court decisions
have held that reckless conduct satisfies the scienter requirement. See, e.g., ITT v. Corn-
feld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d Cir. 1980); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 440 (5th
Cir. 1980); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979).
'" 500 F. Supp. at 292. The business judgment rules provides that directors and of-
ficers of a corporation will not be held liable for mistakes in judgment when they have acted
on a matter calling for the exercise of their discretion and when they have exercised their
judgment in good faith. Id.; see Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th Cir. 1973). The district court in Fluor explained that before Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder courts began to apply the business judgment rule of corporate law to
insulate officers and directors from rule 10b-5 liability when management exercises good
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misconduct should establish liability for nondisclosure, the court declined
to determine the applicable standard of culpability because the evidence
indicated that Fluor acted in good faith, complying with the contractual
publicity embargo on disclosures made prior to the established date for
disclosure. 8' Accordingly, the district court granted Fluor's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of the duty to disclose."9
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's holding
that Fluor had a duty to disclose the existence of the SASOL II contract
during the week of March 3 when rumors became rampant and the price
and volume of Fluor stock shot upward.' In contrast to the district
court's holding, the Second Circuit asserted that a company has no
obligation to clarify or confirm speculation in the marketplace unless the
rumors are traceable to the corporation.' Although Fluor officials had
received inquiries from securities analysts between March 4 and March
6 regarding rumors that Fluor had won a large contract, Fluor officials
made no comment on the veracity of the rumors.' Thus, the rumors
were not attributable to Fluor, and Fluor had no duty to verify the
rumors.'" Moreover, the Fluor court stated that even if the facts in
Fluor gave rise to a duty to disclose, Fluor did not act with the requisite
scienter since there was no evidence of recklessness or intent to deceive
investors.'44
faith discretion. 500 F. Supp. at 292. The court noted that the business judgment rule allows
dirrectors to make quick decisions in good faith without fear of liability. Id. at 293. The
court further stated that the timing of a disclosure is a question for the business judgment
of corporate management. Id.; accord Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d at 518; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n. 12 (2d Cir 1968).
Moreover, the district court believed that a recklessness standard is inappropriate in the
context of corporate disclosure because a corporation might be held liable for mere
knowledge that investors are trading on incomplete or inaccurate knowledge. 500 F. Supp.
at 293. The court observed that courts applying a recklessness standard in cases of aiding
and abetting have held that a defendant's mere knowledge of the danger of a fraudulent ac-
tivity ocurring can constitute recklessness. Id. (citing Roll v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1978); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973)).
"' 500 F. Supp. at 294.
139 Id.
14 654 F.2d at 850.
Id. (citing Elking v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980); Elec-
tronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969)).
1,2 Id. at 850.
14I d.
14 Id. State Teachers also raised the issue on appeal that Fluor had a duty to halt
trading on the NYSE after deciding not to disclose the existence of the SASOL II contract.
Id. The Second Circuit, however, held that under the circumstances Fluor had no duty to
halt trading because Fluor officials did not know the reason for the unusual market activity
in Fluor stock. Id. at 851. The court also stated that Fluor had not acted recklessly or with
fraudulent intent because Fluor officials had revealed to the NYSE that the SASOL II con-
tract might be an explanation for the market activity and because Fluor officials agreed
that the NYSE should halt trading. Id.
The Second Circuit in Fluor also affirmed the district court's holding that a private
right of action does not exist under section A2 of the NYSE Company Manual. Id. at 852-53.
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Theoretically, there are significant benefits to requiring a corpora-
tion to correct or verify market information. A few courts have permit-
ted investors to rely on the integrity of market information in making an
investment decision. " ' These courts have held that an investor does not
have to rely directly on a corporate misrepresentation but may assume
that market information reflects accurate disclosures made by a corpora-
tion. "6 Since courts have indicated that investors can rely on the integrity
of the market, courts accordingly could attempt to preserve the integrity
of market information by requiring a corporation to monitor the ac-
curacy of that information. Moreover, requiring a corporation to correct
or verify market information could result in the prompt and continuous
flow of information necessary for informed investment decisions. "7 In
the '34 Act, Congress imposed periodic disclosure requirements on many
publicly held corporations, but under the statutory disclosure re-
quirements the time for disclosure may not arrive until long after the
material information becomes available."' Imposing a duty to monitor
Section A2 provides that corporations should make a prompt announcement of significant
corporate developments if unusual market activity or rumors occur. Id. at 851-52; see COM-
PANY MANUAL, supra note 95, at A-23. Second Circuit decisions have indicated that certain
rules of a stock exchange promulgated pursuant to section 6(b) of the '34 Act may provide a
private right of action against members of the exchange. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520
F.2d 1373, 1382 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache &
Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). The district court in
Fluor concluded that the NYSE rules requiring disclosure did not give rise to a private
right of action. 500 F. Supp. at 296. The court viewed section A2 in the context of the entire
regulatory scheme and found that Congress and the SEC had already regulated corporate
disclosure requirements. Id. at 296. Since section A2 could not be regarded as a stock ex-
change rule amounting to a substitution for regulation by the SEC itself, the district court
in Fluor refused to imply a private right of action under section A2. Id.; see also Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit in Fluor
agreed with the reasoning of the district court, but further asserted that the requirements
of section A2 were not specific enough to support a private right of action. 654 F.2d at 852.
The court stated, however, that the issue whether a rule of a stock exchange can provide
the basis for a private right of action is unsettled in the Second Circuit. Id. at 853; compare
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 296 n. 11 (1980) (Friendly, J.) (private right of action could be
implied under stock exchange rules) with id. at 337 n. 8 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (private
action may not be implied under rule of stock exchange).
15 See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff did not rely
directly on corporation's misstatement that earnings were high but relied on general lack of
negative information in market in making investment decision); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d
462, 467-71 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff did not directly rely on misleading offering circular but
relied on integrity of bond market).
... See note 149 supra.
.. See Bauman, note 95 supra, at 947.
... See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976) ('34 Act, § 13); 17 C.F.R. § 240.-13a-1, 240.13a-11,
240.13a-13 (1981); FORMS 10-K, 10-Q. Under Form 8-K a corporation must file a current
report within 15 days of a change in control of the registrant, acquisition or disposition of a
significant amount of assets, institution of a material lawsuit, a change in the registrant's
certifying accountant, bankruptcy or receivership, or resignation of a director. FORM 8-K,
Items 1-6. Form 1O-Q requires a corporation to file a quarterly report within 45 days after
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market information could supplement the statutory disclosure re-
quirements of the '34 Act by requiring more prompt disclosure. 49 The
legislative history of the '34 Act indicates that the statutory disclosure
requirements were not to be exclusive but -were only a beginning to re-
quiring a corporation to provide investors with accurate investment in-
formation.1 50 Furthermore, imposing a duty to correct or verify market
information arguably would further the purposes of the '34 Act of pro-
tecting investors, preserving the integrity of the securities markets, and
promoting investor confidence in the securities markets.15'
Although requiring a corporation to correct or verify market infor-
mation would be consistent with the purposes of the '34 Act and might
be beneficial to investors, the Second Circuit in Elkind and Fluor cor-
rectly refused to impose such a duty on a corporation. Courts should not
encourage investors to have blind faith in the accuracy of all market in-
formation. If investors believe that a corporation will correct or verify
all public information, then investors may begin relying on every rumor
or public statement. Yet, a corporation cannot possibly be aware of
every rumor or misstatement and would be unable to correct or verify
all market information." 2 As a result, some investors may misplace their
confidence in the accuracy of information that a corporation has not cor-
rected or verified. Moreover, some investors may attempt to spread
rumors or make misstatements only to prompt a corporation to
respond." The result may be to significantly increase the rumors and
misstatements that circulate in the market.
the end of each of the first three quarters of each fiscal year. FORM 10-Q, § A(b). Form 10-K
requires a registered corporation to file an annual report within 90 days after the end of the
fiscal year. FORM 10-K, General Instruction A(b).
Section 13a of the '34 Act requires every issuer of a security registered pursuant to
section 12 of the '34 Act to file current reports that the SEC prescribes. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1976). Issuers are required to register a class of securities under section 12 if such a class is
listed on a national securities exchange or comprised of equity securities held of record by
at least 500 persons and the issuer's total assets exceed $1 million. Id. at § 781.
... See Bauman, note 95 supra, at 947.
50 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) (reporting requirements
modest beginning to aid investor in obtaining information); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1934) (reporting requirements are minimum in providing protection to investors);
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1383, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934) (hiding and secreting of information
obstructs the operations of the markets as indices of real value).
,'5 See Bauman, note 95 supra, at 947; see also United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341,
347 (9th Cir.) (a purpose of '34 Act is to preserve integrity of securities markets); Woodward
v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1975) (purpose of '34 Act is to protect investors);
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (purpose of '34 Act is to promote
investor confidence in securities markets).
152 See Allen, supra note 195, at 595-96 (a corporation cannot constantly investigate to
determine whether rumors concerning its operations are spreading).
" See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 949 (2d
Cir. 1969) (target corporation made misstatement in effort to force acquiring corporation to
reveal tender offer plans).
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Finally, not imposing on a corporation a duty to disclose corporation
information or to correct or verify rumors is consistent with traditional
concepts of rule 10b-5 liability concerning the duty to disclose. While
rule 10b-5(b) expressly proscribes the making of misrepresentations and
omissions necessary to make prior statements not misleading, the rule
does not expressly proscribe silence when there is a duty to disclose.154
Courts, however, have interpreted rule 10b-5(a) and (c), which proscribe
deceptive schemes and courses of conduct operating as a fraud, to pro-
hibit silence when there is a duty to disclose.155 While courts have not
held that a defendant must trade in securities to violate rule 10b-5 when
making a misrepresentation or an omission necessary to make a prior
statement not misleading,5 ' courts have emphasized that only the act of
trading in securities triggers the duty to disclose. 7 The duty to disclose
arises when one owes a fiduciary duty to another party and enters into a
securities transaction with that party. 58 To avoid liability for failing to
disclose, one must disclose or abstain from trading.'59 While a corpora-
tion occupies a special position in the securities markets as the source of
investment information, the terms of rule 10b-5 do not provide that
courts should apply legal standards to corporations different from stand-
ards applied to any other entity in the securities markets.16 To impose
upon a corporation a duty to disclose even when the corporation is not
trading would be inconsistent with past judicial pronouncements that
15 See note 2 supra.
1" See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152 (1972) (rule 10b-5(a)
and (c) can prohibit nondisclosure when there is a duty to disclose); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718, 733 & n. 6 (8th Cir. 1967) (rule IOb-5(c) can prohibit nondisclosure), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.) (clause (b) does not pro-
hibit nondisclosure, but clauses (a) and (c) can impose duty to disclose), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); Gilbert v. Woods Marketing, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 745, 749 (D. Minn. 1978) (rule
10b-5(a) and (c) proscribe nondisclosure when there is a duty to disclose).
1 See, e.g.,Bartege v. Barnett, 553 F.2d 290, 291 (2d Cir. 1977) (defendant liable for
making misrepresentation that caused plaintiff to purchase from another); G & M, Inc. v.
Newbern, 488 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1973) (defendant need not be a party to securities trans-
action to be held liable for misrepresentation); Braun v. Northern Ohio Bank, 430 F. Supp.
367, 372, 377-78 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (non-trading auditor who misrepresented facts violated rule
10b-5); Crofoot v. Sperry Rand Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (rule well
established that defendant can violate rule 10b-5 for misrepresentation in absence of
trading).
15 See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 315 (6th Cir. 1976) (in context of non-
disclosure one must disclose or abstain from trading to avoid liability); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235-37 (2d Cir. 1974) (one must disclose or
abstain from trading to avoid liability under rule 10b-5 in cases of nondisclosure); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (insiders trading in open market
must disclose or abstain from trading).
' See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-30 (1980); note 17 supra.
"5 See note 157 supra.
' Cf. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 949 (2d




the duty to disclose arises only upon the act of trading. Although a cor-
poration should consider the interests of investors when deciding
whether to disclose corporate information, 1 section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
do not provide a basis for imposing a legal duty on a corporation to
disclose information when the corporation is not a trader in securities.
JAMES R. MAcAYEAL
"' See Exchange Act Release No. 18271 (Nov. 19, 1981) [1981-1982] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 83,049, at 83,049-50 (corporation should take into consideration interests of in-
vestors and disclose information useful to them).
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